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Wilkins: One Moment, Please: Private Devotion in the Public Schools

one moment please private devotion
in the public schools
richard G wilkins
five years ago in the celebrated case of engle vs vitale
twenty
twentyfive
the united states supreme court held that the establishment clause of
the first amendment precluded the board of education of union free
school district number 9 hyde park new york from causing the

following prayer to be said aloud at the beginning of the school day
almighty god we acknowledge our dependence upon thee and we
beg thy blessings upon us our parents our teachers and our country
the court through justice black concluded that the practice was
unconstitutional because it was part of a governmental program to
further religious beliefs that breached the constitutional wall of
separation between church and state 2 in karcher vs may
no 85 1551
1551 the court recently faced but ultimately did not decide
whether the new jersey legislature violated engels constitutional
strictures by providing a moment of silence at the start of each school day
during which students could ponder daydream meditate plan a date
or if they chose pray 3
the question of private devotion in the public schools has been a
engel decision persons opposed to any official
contentious one since the engeldecision
recognition of divinity have used the decision to argue for the extirpation
of all reference to deity from public life 4 on the other hand the decision
has been used as emotional fodder by radicals of another ilk to whip
devotees into furious indignation over the banishment of god from
the classroom 5 whatever the perspective the decision simply resists
receding quietly into the constitutional background
the continuing debate over private devotion in the public schools
has many facets the problem can be approached on a historical basis
those who favor a strict or original intent construction of the
constitution insist that engel and other establishment clause decisions
are flatly inconsistent with the goals originally animating the first
amendment 6 alternatively the controversy can be analyzed somewhat
more pragmatically by focusing not on what the founding fathers
thought or intended but rather on whether prayer or moments of
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silence in the public schools threaten principles that have come to be
fundamental to american democracy 7 this has been the approach taken
by the court during the past several decades 8 but whatever the analytical
approach it is my contention that providing public schoolchildren
school children with
a moment of silence during which they can ponder meditate or pray does
proscript ions of the first amendments establishment
proscriptions
not transgress the prescriptions
clause
A MOMENT OF SILENCE IN

historical perspective

recently it has been somewhat in vogue for conservative legal
scholars to attack the historical foundation for the courts religion clause
cases 9 the wall of separation between church and state upon which
engel and other establishment clause decisions are based has been
decried by chief justice rehnquist for one as a metaphor based on bad
which has proved useless as a guide to judging 100 indeed the
history
problems with the church state wall become apparent upon even
cursory examination
in the first place thomas jefferson the first person to use the
wall construct was out of the country at the time the first amendment was debated and adopted he is accordingly a less than
ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the
12
moreover the records of the debates surrounding
religion clauses
the drafting of the first amendment suggest that the primary concerns of
the founding fathers were to prevent establishment of a national church
and the preference of one religious sect over another they did not set out
to construct a wall that would preclude any government acknowledgment of or even generalized aid to religion 13 indeed it is quite clear that
the drafters of the first amendment did not even intend to prohibit
limited governmental endorsement of religion one day after the house
form of the first amendment that
of representatives voted to adopt the fonn
was ultimately ratified it passed a resolution asking george washington
to issue a thanksgiving day proclamation 14
thus the men who drafted and adopted the establishment clause of
the first amendment almost certainly did not perceive in it a wall that
would prohibit school
schoolchildren
children from voluntarily acknowledging their
dependence upon god or begging his blessings upon us our parents
our teachers and our country 15 it follows a fortiori that they would not
have considered a moment of silence statute which merely provides a
moment for meditation or prayer by those who want to pray unconstitutional A moment of silence ceremony or even a voluntary nondenomi
national prayer such as that involved in engel that does not seriously
threaten creation of a state church or evidence hostility to any particular
creed seems fairly far removed from the core concerns that prompted
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enactment of the first amendment 16 from a historical or original
intent viewpoint therefore the constitutionality of a moment of silence
provision such as that enacted by the new jersey legislature should be
unquestionable
it is however quite unlikely that the moment of silence debate
will be settled by pointing out the faulty historical footing of engel
two terms ago in wallace vs jaffree the supreme court expressly
rejected a strict historical approach to the establishment clause 17 the
united states district court for the district of alabama had upheld the
constitutionality of a statute that explicitly returned prayer to the public
schools on the grounds that the supreme court had erred in engel and
other cases by applying the strictures of the first amendment to the
states from a historical point of view the district court was probably
correct the founding fathers did not intend the religion clauses to
apply to the states as evidenced by the persistence of state e stablished
stabli shed
churches in massachusetts new hampshire maryland and rhode
island well into the nineteenth century 8 nevertheless the supreme
court summarily affirmed the court of appeals reversal of the lower
courts holding 19
the writers of the establishment clause may well have never
dreamed that preventing the federal government from establishing a
national church would in turn hobble the states but original intent is
no longer controlling in this sensitive area of constitutional law 20 the
supreme court began applying various provisions of the bill of rights
to the states in the late nineteenth century and it is simply too late in the
day to abandon that course 21 indeed most ordinary citizens would be
shocked at the mere suggestion that although the federal government
could not establish a church their state legislatures could the current
controversy over moments of silence in the public schools likely will not
be resolved by pointing out to the supreme court that its decision in
engel would receive a flunking grade if submitted as a paper in a
constitutional history course 22
A MOMENT OF SILENCE IN THE MODERN COURT

rather than take a strictly historical approach to establishment
clause issues the modem court has analyzed several factors to determine
whether particular government actions unduly involve the church or state
in the affairs of the other indeed only one case decided during the past
twenty years marsh vs chambers has utilized a strict historical analysis
of an establishment clause issue 23 instead beginning with its 1971
decision in lemon vs kurtzman the court has quite regularly applied a
three pronged test to determine the constitutionality of governmental
activities ranging from the provision of bus transportation to parochial
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school students to the erection of a christmas creche in a city park 24
under that test government actions challenged under the establishment
clause must meet the following criteria first the action must have a
secular legislative purpose second its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion finally it must not
25
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion 1125
the courts application of the lemon factors has been fairly
consistent however because state action must meet all three criteria in
order to pass constitutional muster and because the proper application of
the three factors to concrete fact is almost always debatable the results
obtained from the lemon test can only be described as spotty and
inconsistent 26 but despite the difficulties of the lemon test no majority
of the court has shown an inclination to abandon it
application of the lemon test to a moment of silence statute is
problematic depending on the predilections of individual jurists a
simple moment of silence can be viewed as violating all or none of the
lemon factors the district court in karcher vs may for example
concluded that the new jersey moment of silence statute violated all
three prongs of the test 227 even though the state urged before the trial
court that a moment of silence had the secular purpose of providing a
school
transition between non
nonschool
nonschoo
schoo1 and school activities and supported
that assertion with significant testimony by experienced educators and
other experts the trial court rejected that proffered purpose as an after
the fact rationalization 11228 the district court made this finding despite its
9929
5529
29
recognition that a brief period of silence serves a transition purpose 5929
it further found that a moment of silence had the effect of advancing
religion by mandating a period at the start of each school day when all
students would have an opportunity to engage in prayer 0 30 finally the
court found that the statute was unduly entangling because a required
minute of silence would put children and parents who believed in prayer
in the public schools against children and parents who do not 31
the united states court of appeals for the third circuit applying
the same legal test disagreed with virtually all of the district courts
12
reasoning 32
the court of appeals rejected the holding that the statute
violated the effects test simply by designating a time and place when
children and teachers may pray reasoning that the state equally injects
itself into religious matters when it designates a time and place when
children and teachers may not pray 33 it similarly rejected the notion
that the statute was im permissibly entangling because of its potential
for divisiveness noting the reality that any governmental action to
accommodate religious belief will upset someone the court of appeals
wrote if political divisiveness were the test for entanglement no
governmental accommodation of religion would survive establishment
clause scrutiny 34 but despite its well reasoned conclusion that the
O
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moment of silence statute did not violate the effects and entanglement prongs of
district court
affirmed
thedistrict
oflemon
finned the
lemon the court of appeals af
on the grounds that the asserted secular purpose for the statute was
pretextual 35
the question whether the new jersey moment of silence statute has
a secular purpose is not readily answered in a lengthy concurring
opinion to a decision invalidating bible reading in the public schools
handed down the year after engel justice brennan suggested that states
could avoid violating the establishment clause but still accommodate the
desires of those students who want to pray by providing for a brief
moment of silence at the start of each school day such a ceremony he
suggested would serve the solely secular ends of fostering harmony
and tolerance among the pupils enhancing the authority of the teacher
and inspiring better discipline 36
by making the apparently sensible suggestion that a state could
serve a secular purpose and still accommodate the religious needs of its
students by adopting a moment of silence ceremony justice brennan set
up a subtle catch 22 that was seized upon by the district court in
karcher to invalidate the new jersey statute yes the district court
acknowledged a moment of silence may have a secular purpose how
ever because it is also adopted to facilitate religious practice to provide
a period at the start of each school day when all students would have an
opportunity to engage in prayer the secular purpose ipso facto converts
to a sectarian purpose the accommodation of prayer 37 the court of
appeals in karcher failed to find its way out of this box indeed the court
explicitly noted that the new jersey statute did not endorse or encourage
prayer and that the only possible sectarian purpose for the moment of
silence was to accommodate the desires of those who wanted to pray
nevertheless the court of appeals refused to let the state out of the logical
conundrum created by the trial court A moment of silence may have a
secular purpose but because it also has the purpose of accommodating
religious belief it is constitutionally infirm 38
the heads you lose tails 1I win reasoning of the lower courts in
karcher could have been easily rectified by the supreme court the
courts prior cases applying the purpose prong of lemon established
that a statute need not have exclusively secular objectives to pass
constitutional muster 39 it need only have a secular purpose the fact
that a moment of silence accommodates religious belief in addition to
non school to school life
providing a secular transition period from nonschool
should be constitutionally irrelevant
but while this approach to the purpose prong avoids the logical
traps of the lower courts analysis it too is troubling if indeed all that is
needed under lemons purpose test is a plausible secular purpose and
if any such purpose will do there is very little substance left to the
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inquiry human ingenuity being what it is state or national legislatures
will have little difficulty articulating some plausible secular goal for
almost any undertaking no matter how entwined with matters of
religion although most such actions would probably run afoul of one of
the other lemon prongs effect or entanglement the fact remains that
merely requiring a secular purpose renders the purpose test a virtual
dead letter 41 yet the alternative exemplified by the logical juggernaut
created by the lower courts in karcher where any plausible sectarian
purpose is fatal is equally unacceptable
faced with these legal realities 1I have concluded that the lemon
test does not promote thoughtful constitutional analysis of moment of
silence statutes such statutes as the court of appeals in karcher noted
should be acceptable under the effect and entanglement tests 42 but
the ease with which those factors can be manipulated to support the
contrary result as exemplified by the district courts opinion in
karcher is troublesome and the question whether such statutes have
a secular purpose may not be worth asking the answer will always
depend upon the point from which the questioner begins and the
selection of that starting point will always be little more than an apse
ipse dixit
THE CORE CONCERNS COERCION AND debilitation
OF government AND RELIGION

because of the difficulties inherent in the consistent and reasoned
application of the lemon test the validity of a moment of silence statute
should not depend in the final analysis upon a rote inquiry into purpose
effect and entanglement rather the constitutional question should turn
on whether such a statute transgresses the fundamental concerns that led
the court to invalidate the recitation of a school prayer in engel in that
case the court was troubled primarily by a prescribed prayers coercion
of the individual right of conscience and its concomitant debilitation of
both government and religion legislative enactments which accommodate religious expression but which do not coerce individual conscience
or debilitate religious expression should pass constitutional muster
in striking down state prescribed prayers the court wrote when
the power prestige and financial support of government is placed behind
a particular religious belief the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain the court further noted that a union of government and religion
tends to destroy government and to degrade religion 43 A neutral
moment of silence provision however does not pose any serious threat
to individual conscience or the essential autonomy of church and state 44
perhaps more importantly the provision of an opportunity for private
contemplation or introspection facilitates the exercise of individual
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rights 45 the establishment clause should not preclude governmental
accommodation of the felt need of many persons for voluntary religious
expression
As noted earlier the supreme court in jaffree summarily invalidated a statute that provided for the recitation of a state sponsored prayer
it also invalidated a moment of silence provision enacted by the state of
alabama it did so however only because the legislative history of that
statute demonstrated that the provisions sole purpose was to return
prayer to the public schools for example the principal legislative
sponsor of the alabama statute testified that he had no other purpose for
the statute other than returning voluntary prayer to the public
moreover the statute invalidated in jaffree which provided
schools
a moment of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer was enacted
despite the presence of an earlier statute that authorized a moment of
silence for meditation in such circumstances the court concluded that
the statute was enacted to convey a message of state endorsement and
promotion of prayer 47 because such an endorsement could have the
effect of intimidating or coercing those who chose not to pray the statute
suffered the defect found fatal in engel
other moment of silence statutes so long as they neither encourage
nor discourage prayer should not suffer the same constitutional infirmi
infirri
ties the new jersey statute for example provided
principals and teachers in each public elementary and secondary school of
each school district in this state shall permit students to observe a one
minute period of silence to be used solely at the discretion of the individual
student before opening exercise of each school day for quiet and private
contemplation or introspection 48

such statutes do not create the same dangers as the recitation of a
ascribed prayer unlike the established prayer in engel neutral
state pre
scribed
prescribed
moment of silence statutes protect both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all they plainly are not an instrument
for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view an
individual finds unacceptable 49 moreover such statutes do not
disrupt the essential autonomy of church and state first neutral moment
missive
nissive only they do not require students to do
permissive
of silence statutes are pen
anything other than remain silent students need not close their eyes
bow their heads or assume any posture suggestive of religion or
irreligion second the language of such statutes is absolutely neutral as
to religion prayer is not even mentioned third in contrast to the
alabama moment of silence statute a truly neutral statute is not enacted
exclusively to promote prayer several new jersey legislators for
example suggested that a moment of silence is provided to help restore
order in the classroom 50 finally unlike the prayer at issue in engel
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a moment of silence does not involve the state or the church in
religious indoctrination of any kind thus on the surface such statutes
do not run afoul of the evils identified in engel they cannot coerce
individual conscience because they do not require any particular
thought they do not interfere with church state autonomy because they
do not contemplate the involvement of either entity in the affairs of the
other 51
moreover unlike the situation in engel there is good reason to
conclude that a moment of silence facilitates rather than inhibits the
exercise and enjoyment of precious individual liberties the argument
has occasionally been made that because compulsory attendance at
public school effectively precludes many opportunities for personal
prayer a moment of silence to accommodate such activity is not only
permissible but is in fact constitutionally required by the free exercise
clause which ofcourse
of course prohibits government from interfering with
the free exercise of religion the court in jaffree suggested that such
an argument is weak 52 but even though the state may be under no
constitutional command to provide an opportunity for private prayer the
free exercise argument cannot be ignored the provision of a moment
of silence in the context of a public school a structured compulsory
state institution where contemplative opportunities are limited
necessarily furthers values protected by the free exercise clause 53 As
justice brennan has noted even when the government is not compelled
to do so by the free exercise clause it may to some extent act to facilitate
the opportunities of individuals to practice their religion 54
state efforts to facilitate opportunities for voluntary private
devotion in the public schools should be sustained so long as they do
not as in engel infringe upon the individuals freedom to choose his
own creed 55 A statute which simply permits a moment for quiet and
private contemplation or introspection at the sole discretion of the
individual student is neutral among religions and between religion and
nonreligion such a statute neither favors one religion over another
nor conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion 56 As
with the released time religious study program upheld thirty five years
ago in zorach vs clauson a simple moment of silence leaves students
to their own desires as to
their religious devotions if any 57
the court in jaffree noted that an attempt to return prayer to the
public schools is of course quite different from merely protecting every
students right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate
moment of silence during the schoolday 58 the court has also noted that
in our modem complex society whose traditions and constitutional
underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all
areas an absolutist approach in applying the establishment clause is
simplistic 59 the fundamental goal of the religion clauses of the first
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amendment should not become the removal of all traces of religion from
public life 60 on the contrary the constitution affirmatively mandates
accommodation not merely tolerance of all religions and forbids
school children with the opporhostility toward any 61 by providing its schoolchildren
scho olday
tunity for voluntary private introspection at the start of each schoolday
state legislatures do not transgress constitutional limits rather as the
supreme court noted in zorach by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs they follow the best of our traditions 62
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